Jump to content

VMRO-DPMNE

Page semi-protected
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity
Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско национално единство
AbbreviationVMRO-DPMNE
LeaderHristijan Mickoski[1]
Secretary-GeneralGjorgjija Sajkoski
Vice-PresidentAleksandar Nikoloski
Vlado Misajlovski
Timčo Mucunski
Gordana Dimitrievska Kocovska
FoundersLjubčo Georgievski[4]
Dragan Bogdanovski
Boris Zmejkovski
Gojko Jakovlevski[5]
Founded17 June 1990
HeadquartersSkopje
Youth wingYouth Force Union
Ideology
Political positionCentre-right to right-wing
National affiliationYour Macedonia
European affiliationEuropean People's Party (associate)
International affiliationInternational Democracy Union[3]
Colours  Red
  Black
  Gold
Assembly
55 / 120
Mayors
42 / 80
Local councils
468 / 1,333
Skopje city council
18 / 45
Website
vmro-dpmne.org.mk

The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (Macedonian: Внатрешна македонска револуционерна организација – Демократска партија за македонско национално единство), abbreviated as VMRO-DPMNE (Macedonian: ВМРО–ДПМНЕ), is a conservative[6][7] and the main centre-right[8][9][10] to right-wing[11] political party in North Macedonia.

It was established as a nationalist and anti-communist party. It has later rebranded itself as Christian-democratic.[4][7][12] The party claims that their goals and objectives are to express the tradition of the Macedonian people on whose political struggle and concepts it is based.[13][14] Nevertheless, it has formed multiple coalition governments with ethnic minority parties.[15] Under the leadership of Ljubčo Georgievski in the 1990s, the party supported Macedonian independence from Socialist Yugoslavia, and led a policy of closer relationships with Bulgaria.[16] Georgievski left VMRO-DPMNE and formed the VMRO – People's Party in 2004.[17]

Under the leadership of Nikola Gruevski, the party promoted ultranationalist[18] identity politics in the form of antiquisation. Its nationalist stances were often also anti-Albanian.[19] During Gruevski's leadership the party changed from a pro-European and а pro-NATO policy, to a Russophilic, pro-Serbian and anti-Western one.[20][further explanation needed] His government also managed to build strong anti-EU sentiments within the country.[21][further explanation needed]

Background

The party's full name consists of the acronyms "VMRO" (standing for Vnatrešna Makedonska Revolucionerna Organizacija and referencing the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), a rebel movement formed in 1893)[22] and "DPMNE" (Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity, Demokratska partija za makedonsko nacionalno edinstvo).[23][24] After undergoing various transformations, the original organisation was suppressed after the military coup d'état of 1934, in its headquarters in Bulgaria. At that time the territory of the current North Macedonia was a province called Vardar Banovina, part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. As the Bulgarian army entered Yugoslav Macedonia as German satellite during WWII, former IMRO members were active in organising Bulgarian Action Committees, charged with taking over the local authorities. After Bulgaria switched to the Allied in September 1944, they tried to create a pro-Bulgarian independent Macedonian state under the protectorate of the Third Reich.[25][26] VMRO–DPMNE claims ideological descent from the old IMRO,[27] although there is no known continuity between the two organisations.[28] The historical IMRO was as a whole pro-Bulgarian grouping,[29][30] and its membership was allowed initially only for Bulgarians.[31][32]

History

Foundation and rise to power

Following the death of Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito in 1980, SFR Yugoslavia began to disintegrate and democratic politics were revived in Macedonia. Many exiles returned to then SR Macedonia from abroad, and a new generation of young Macedonian intellectuals rediscovered the history of Macedonian nationalism. Dragan Bogdanovski who was a proclaimed Macedonian rights movement activist had made a blueprint for a Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity. He had also made a statute, book of rules, and an instruction of how the party will work. Ljubčo Georgievski and Bogdanovski, Boris Zmejkovski, and a few other activists agreed to make a party for a future independent Macedonia. Under the name VMRO–DPMNE, it was founded on 17 June 1990 in Skopje,[33] as a Macedonian nationalist and anti-communist party.[34][23][35] Georgievski was elected as the party's first president in the constituent assembly.[36] The party advocated for the independence of Macedonia, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army, creation of a Macedonian defence force, establishment of an independent currency and international recognition as a sovereign state.[37]

After the first multi-party elections in 1990, VMRO–DPMNE became the strongest party in the parliament.[38] It did not form a government because it did not achieve a majority of seats; this forced it to form a coalition with an ethnic Albanian party, but it refused to do so. The party boycotted the second round of the 1994 elections claiming fraud in the first round.[36] During the early 1990s, the party presented itself as an extreme right-wing nationalist party with anti-Albanian sentiments.[23] It also promoted the irredentist concept of United Macedonia.[39] By the mid-1990s, it created offices in most major cities.[38] The party opposed the 1995 Interim Accord with Greece.[40] During that period, the party moderated its rhetoric.[23] After winning the 1998 election, VMRO–DPMNE formed a coalition government with the Democratic Alternative and Democratic Party of Albanians (DPA), with Georgievski as Prime Minister.[36] In 1999, VMRO–DPMNE's candidate Boris Trajkovski was elected President. Under Georgievski, there was an improvement in Bulgaria–Macedonia relations.[17] He signed a bilateral agreement with Bulgarian prime minister Ivan Kostov regarding good neighbourly relations.[14]

In 2001, the party participated in a government of national unity.[41] VMRO–DPMNE's government was defeated at the 2002 parliamentary elections. In an alliance with the Liberal Party of Macedonia, VMRO–DPMNE won 28 out of 120 seats. In 2004, Trajkovski died in a plane crash and Branko Crvenkovski was elected president, defeating VMRO–DPMNE's candidate Saško Kedev. After losing the 2002 elections, Georgievski left the party and established the VMRO-NP in 2004.[17]

Nikola Gruevski was elected as the new leader of the party in May 2003.[36] The widespread public support for EU membership in the 2000s encouraged the party to evolve into a moderate and pro-European party.[38] It also rebranded itself as centre-right and Christian democratic.[4] VMRO-DPMNE opposed the legalisation of the Tetovo University in early 2004.[24] The party became the largest party in parliament again after a net gain of over a dozen seats in the 2006 parliamentary elections. With 44 of 120 seats, the party formed a government in coalition with the DPA again, with Gruevski becoming the prime minister.[36] In its 2006 party programme, it emphasised the pursuit of EU and NATO membership as its major foreign policy goals.[42] On 15 May 2007, the party became an observer-member of the European People's Party.[17]

The party won 2008 early parliamentary elections. In the 120-seat Assembly, VMRO–DPMNE won 63 seats and formed a coalition government with the Democratic Union for Integration.[7][36] In 2009, the VMRO–DPMNE-led coalition "For a better Macedonia" won 56 out of 84 municipalities, the party's presidential candidate Gjorge Ivanov also won the presidential election.[43] The party won again in the 2011 early parliamentary elections. VMRO–DPMNE won 56 seats of the 120-seat Assembly of the Republic of Macedonia, the party formed a government in coalition with the Democratic Union for Integration in the Macedonian Parliament (mandate period 2011–2015). In 2014, early parliamentary elections were held together with the presidential election, VMRO–DPMNE won again 61 seats of the 120-seat Assembly and formed a government in coalition with the Democratic Union for Integration (mandate period 2014–2018).

Antiquisation and Skopje 2014

See also: Antiquisation and Skopje 2014

The party pursued the "antiquisation" policy between 2006 and 2017, in which it sought to claim ancient Macedonian figures like Alexander the Great and Philip II of Macedon for the country. The policy was pursued since its coming to power in 2006,[44] and especially since Macedonia's non-invitation to NATO in 2008, as a way of putting pressure on Greece as well as in an attempt to construct a new identity on the basis of a presumed link to the world of antiquity.[45][46] The policy received academic criticism as it demonstrated feebleness of archaeology and other historical disciplines in public discourse, as well as a danger of marginalization.[47] The policy also attracted criticism domestically, by ethnic Macedonians within the country, who saw as dangerously dividing the country between those who identify with classical antiquity and those who identify with the country's Slavic culture.[45] Ethnic Albanians saw it as an attempt to marginalize them and exclude them from the national narrative.[45] Bulgaria also accused the country of falsification of history.[45] According to researcher Anastas Vangeli, it harmed interethnic relations and the country's international position.[48] Foreign diplomats warned that the policy reduced international sympathy for Macedonia's position in the naming dispute with Greece.[45] SDSM was opposed to the Skopje 2014 project and alleged that the monuments could have cost six to ten times less than what the government paid, which may already have exceeded 600 million euros.[49][50][51] In 2012, a statue of the member of the IMRO Simeon Radev, who was also a Bulgarian diplomat, was installed on the building of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but it was later taken down, and according to Makfax, with the explanation that it had been a mistake.[52][53] The party built new headquarters for itself in Skopje in 2015.[54]

Macedonian political crisis

See also: 2011 Macedonian protests, 2015 Macedonian protests, 2016 Macedonian protests, and 2017 storming of Macedonian Parliament

In the 2010s and the 2020s, Georgievski criticised the party several times, seeing it as a personal failure and a fake party without any ideology, etc.[55] The party opposed the Friendship Treaty with Bulgaria in 2017.[56]

As a result of the political crisis, the political parties signed the Pržino Agreement, which also resulted in the resignation of Gruevski in January 2016.[57][58] VMRO-DPMNE was widely accused of nepotism and authoritarianism and was involved in a series of wiretapping, corruption and money-laundering scandals, with the Macedonian Special Prosecution ordering in 2017 a series of investigations against the party's former leader and ex-Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski, as well as ministers and other high-ranked officials, for involvement in illegal activities. In 2018, amid ongoing investigations, a Skopje court froze the party's property assets.[59] Gruevski himself was sentenced to two years in prison for the illegal purchase of a Mercedes car in 2018 but fled to Hungary when he was ordered to serve his prison sentence.[60] Nevertheless, he remained an honorary chairman of the party until July 2020.[61] On 8 October 2018, Gordana Jankulovska, the former Minister of Interior and senior member of the party, was sentenced to six years in prison for illegally purchasing the Mercedes, which Gruevski had used secretly.[62][63]

Mickoski's leadership

Hristijan Mickoski became the leader of the party on 23 December 2017, replacing Gruevski.[64] VMRO-DPMNE has been criticised for its hard-line stance against the Prespa Agreement that was reached in June 2018 between the Republic of Macedonia and Greece, which resolved the long-standing Macedonia naming dispute by renaming the country as North Macedonia and recognising that Macedonian culture and language are distinct and unrelated to ancient Hellenic civilisation. On 16 October 2018, US Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell sent a letter to Mickoski, in which he expressed the disappointment of the United States with the positions of the party's leadership, including him personally, regarding its position against the Prespa agreement and asked him to "set aside partisan interests" and work to get the name change approved.[65][66][67] Despite the party's opposition, eight deputies of the party voted in favour of the initiation of the constitutional amendments to allow the country's name change.[68][17]

In April 2022, a Bulgarian club named after the last leader of the historical IMRO, Ivan Mihailov, was officially opened in Bitola. After its opening, the club was set on fire, and Mickoski demanded that the arsonist, who was arrested, be released.[69] The deputy chairman of the party Alexander Nikoloski expressed later his support to the decision of the Commission for Protection against Discrimination, which announced that the club "Ivan Mihailov" is discriminative towards the citizens of the country on national and ethnic grounds. VMRO-DPMNE deputy Rashela Mizrahi declared also the last leader of the organisation whose name it bears to be a fascist.[70][71] Later, the party submitted a bill demanding that such names be banned for use in the country to increase distancing from fascism and Nazism.[72][73] The bill was adopted, in collaboration with the Social Democratic Union of Macedonia.[74]

The party became the main oppositional force which participated in the 2022 North Macedonia protests, surrounding its accession into the EU.[75][76] In September 2022, the party proposed a referendum under which the friendship treaty between Bulgaria and North Macedonia would be denounced.[77][78] The party is against the recognition of the Bulgarians in North Macedonia as an official ethnic minority, which is conditio sine qua non the country to become a member of the EU.[79][80] In this way, the party effectively halted the European integration of North Macedonia.[81] The party won the 2024 parliamentary elections.[82][83] It formed a government with VLEN and ZNAM in June.[84]

Youth Force Union

The Youth Force Union (Macedonian: Унија на млади сили на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ), also known as UMS (Macedonian: УМС), is the youth wing organisation of the VMRO-DPMNE, formed in 1991.[85]

A number of projects arising from the Youth Force Union were conducted in the past 20 years. It organised demonstrations against the introduction of the Albanian language in the pedagogical faculty of the University of Skopje in 1997.[86][87]

Election results

Presidential elections

Election Party candidate Votes % Votes % Result
First round Second round
1994 Ljubiša Georgievski 197,109 21.6% - - Lost Red XN
1999 Boris Trajkovski 219,098 21.1% 582,808 53.2% Elected Green tickY
2004 Saško Kedev 309,132 34.1% 329,179 37.4% Lost Red XN
2009 Gjorge Ivanov 345,850 35.04% 453,616 63.14% Elected Green tickY
2014 449,442 51.69% 534,910 55.28% Elected Green tickY
2019 Gordana Siljanovska-Davkova 318,341 44.16% 377,713 46.41% Lost Red XN
2024 363,085 41.21% 561,000 69.01% Elected Green tickY

Assembly elections

Election Party leader Vote % Seats +/– Position Government
1990 Ljubčo Georgievski First round 154,101 14.3%
38 / 120
 Increase 38 Increase 1st Opposition
Second round 238,367 29.9%
1994 First round 141,946 14.3%
0 / 120
 Decrease 38 Extra-parliamentary
Second round Boycotted
1998 First round 312,669 28.1%
49 / 120
 Increase 49 Increase 1st Government
Second round 381,196 49%
2002 298,404 25%
33 / 120
 Decrease 16 Decrease 2nd Opposition
2006 Nikola Gruevski 303,543 32.5%
45 / 120
 Increase 12 Increase 1st Government
2008 481,501 48.48%
63 / 120
 Increase 18 Steady 1st Government
2011 438,138 39.98%
56 / 123
 Decrease 7 Steady 1st Government
2014 481,615 42.98%
61 / 123
 Increase 5 Steady 1st Government
2016 454,519 38.14%
51 / 120
 Decrease 10 Steady 1st Opposition
2020 Hristijan Mickoski 315,344 34.57%
44 / 120
 Decrease 7 Decrease 2nd Opposition
2024 436,407 44.58%
58 / 120
 Increase 14 Increase 1st Government

See also

References

  1. ^ "Мицкоски се обрати кон своите сопартијци од ВМРО-ДПМНЕ: Еве што им порача" [Mickoski addressed his fellow party members from VMRO-DPMNE: Here is what he told them]. Biznis Vesti (in Macedonian). 23 December 2017. Archived from the original on 8 August 2022. Retrieved 23 December 2017.
  2. ^ Jebb, Cindy R. (2006). The Fight for Legitimacy: Democracy vs. Terrorism. Praeger Publishing. p. 65. ISBN 978-0275991890.
  3. ^ "Members". International Democracy Union. February 2018. Retrieved 19 July 2024.
  4. ^ a b c Berglund, Sten, ed. (2013). The Handbook of Political Change in Eastern Europe. Edward Elgar Publishing. pp. 621–622. ISBN 978-1782545880.
  5. ^ Daskalovski, Židas (2006). Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia, 1989-2004. Globic. p. 46. ISBN 978-0977666232.
  6. ^ Bakke, Elisabeth (2010). "Central and East European party systems since 1989". In Ramet, Sabrina P. (ed.). Central and Southeast European Politics since 1989. Cambridge University Press. p. 79. ISBN 978-0-521-88810-3.
  7. ^ a b c Nordsieck, Wolfram (2020). "North Macedonia". Parties and Elections in Europe. Retrieved 16 July 2020.
  8. ^ Bideleux, Robert; Jeffries, Ian (2007). The Balkans: A Post-Communist History. Taylor & Francis. p. 419. ISBN 978-0-415-22962-3.
  9. ^ Piano, Aili (30 September 2009). Freedom in the World 2009: The Annual Survey of Political Rights & Civil Liberties. Rowman & Littlefield. p. 433. ISBN 978-1-4422-0122-4.
  10. ^ Fluri, Philipp H.; Gustenau, Gustav E.; Pantev, Plamen I. (19 September 2005). "Macedonian Reform Perspectives". The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism. Springer. p. 170. ISBN 978-3-7908-1572-6.
  11. ^ Atanasov, Petar (2005). "Macedonian Reform Perspectives". In Fluri, Philipp H.; Gustenau, Gustav E.; Pantev, Plamen I. (eds.). The Evolution of Civil–Military Relations in South East Europe: Continuing Democratic Reform and Adapting to the Needs of Fighting Terrorism. Springer Science+Business Media. p. 170. ISBN 978-3-7908-1572-6.
  12. ^ "Key political Parties in Macedonia". Balkan Insight. 27 September 2012.
  13. ^ "Вмро – Дпмне". Vmro-dpmne.org.mk. Retrieved 30 April 2014.
  14. ^ a b Eben Friedman (2004). "Party System, Electoral Systems and Minority Representation in the Republic of Macedonia from 1990 to 2002". European Yearbook of Minority Issues: 2002-2003. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. pp. 231, 234–236. ISBN 9789004138391.
  15. ^ ""Победи Македонија со организирањето на уште едни фер и демократски избори"". MKD.MK (in Macedonian). Archived from the original on 29 October 2013. Retrieved 6 May 2013.
  16. ^ Stefan Troebst (1997). "An Ethnic War That Did Not Take Place: Macedonia, Its Minorities and Its Neighbours in the 1990s". In David Turton (ed.). War and Ethnicity: Global Connections and Local Violence. University of Rochester Press. p. 78. ISBN 9781878822826.
  17. ^ a b c d e Dimitar Bechev (2019). Historical Dictionary of North Macedonia (2nd ed.). Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 124–125, 149–151. ISBN 9781538119624.
  18. ^ Arianna Piacentini (2019). "Make Macedonia Great Again! The New Face of Skopje and the Macedonians' identity dilemma". In Evinç Doğan (ed.). Reinventing Eastern Europe: Imaginaries, Identities and Transformations. London: Transnational Press. p. 87. ISBN 978-1910781876.
  19. ^ Tom Lansford, ed. (2019). Political Handbook of the World 2018-2019. CQ Press. p. 968. ISBN 978-1544327136.
  20. ^
  21. ^ Irena Rajcinovska Pandeva (2021). "North Macedonia: The Name in Exchange for European Union Membership?". In Michael Kaeding; Johannes Pollak; Paul Schmidt (eds.). Euroscepticism and the Future of Europe. Springer Nature. p. 107. ISBN 9783030412722.
  22. ^ Vasiliki P. Neofotistos (2020). Macedonia and Identity Politics After the Prespa Agreement. Routledge. p. 22. ISBN 9780367407292.
  23. ^ a b c d Vera Stojarová; Peter Emerson, eds. (2013). Party Politics in the Western Balkans. Routledge. pp. 175–176. ISBN 9781135235857.
  24. ^ a b Cvete Koneska (2016). After Ethnic Conflict: Policy-making in Post-conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia. Routledge. pp. 65, 144–146. ISBN 9781317183976.
  25. ^ Victor Roudometof (2002). Collective Memory, National Identity, and Ethnic Conflict: Greece, Bulgaria, and the Macedonian Question. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 99. ISBN 0275976483.
  26. ^ Todor Chepreganov (2008). History of the Macedonian People. Skopje: Institute of National History, Ss. Cyril and Methodius University. p. 254.
  27. ^ Alan John Day; Roger East; Richard Thomas (2002). A Political and Economic Dictionary of Eastern Europe: Alan J. Day, Roger East and Richard Thomas [ed.]. Routledge. p. 275. ISBN 978-1-85743-063-9.
  28. ^ Bernard A. Cook (2001). Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia, Volume 2. Taylor & Francis. p. 813. ISBN 9780815340584.
  29. ^ Stuart J. Kaufman (2001). Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Cornell University Press. p. 193. ISBN 0801487366. A more modern national hero is Gotse Delchev, leader of the turn-of-the-century Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (IMRO), which was actually a largely pro-Bulgarian organization but is claimed as the founding Macedonian national movement.
  30. ^ Ulf Brrunnbauer (2004). "Historiography, Myths and the Nation in the Republic of Macedonia". (Re)Writing History. Historiography in Southeast Europe after Socialism. Studies on South East Europe, vol. 4. LIT, Münster. pp. 165–200. ISBN 382587365X. The first name of the IMRO was "Bulgarian Macedonian-Adrianople Revolutionary Committees", which was later changed several times. Initially its membership was restricted only for Bulgarians. It was active not only in Macedonia but also in Thrace (the Vilayet of Adrianople). Since its early name emphasized the Bulgarian nature of the organization by linking the inhabitants of Thrace and Macedonia to Bulgaria, these facts are still difficult to be explained from the Macedonian historiography. They suggest that IMRO revolutionaries in the Ottoman period did not differentiate between 'Macedonians' and 'Bulgarians'. Moreover, as their own writings attest, they often saw themselves and their compatriots as 'Bulgarians' and wrote in Bulgarian standard language.
  31. ^ Laura Beth Sherman (1980). Fires on the mountain: the Macedonian revolutionary movement and the kidnapping of Ellen Stone, Volume 62. East European Monographs. p. 10. ISBN 0914710559. The revolutionary committee dedicated itself to fight for "full political autonomy for Macedonia and Adrianople." Since they sought autonomy only for those areas inhabited by Bulgarians, they denied other nationalities membership in IMRO. According to Article 3 of the statutes, "any Bulgarian could become a member".
  32. ^ "Serving the Nation: Ulf Brunnbauer, Historiography in the Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) After Socialism". Historein. 4: 171. 2003. The most controversial revisionist effort concerned the attempt to include the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (VMRO) of the interwar period within the Macedonian national narrative. Previous scholarship had regarded this organization as a reactionary force of Bulgarian expansionism, pointing to its support for conservative circles in Bulgaria, its contacts with the fascist Croatian Ustashe and Nazi Germany, and its display of Bulgarian national identity. The attempt to rehabilitate it was directly linked to efforts by the VMRO-DPMNE party, to declare itself the legitimate successor of the historical VMRO.
  33. ^ Židas Daskalovski (2006). Walking on the Edge: Consolidating Multiethnic Macedonia, 1989-2004. Globic Press. p. 46. ISBN 9780977666232.
  34. ^ Jenkins, Brian; Sofos, Spyros A., eds. (1996). Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe. Routledge. p. 255. ISBN 9780415123129.
  35. ^ Bugajski, Janusz (1995). Ethnic Politics in Eastern Europe: A Guide to Nationality Policies, Organizations, and Parties. M. E. Sharpe. p. 463. ISBN 978-0-7656-1911-2.
  36. ^ a b c d e f Gianluca Passarelli, ed. (2018). The Presidentialisation of Political Parties in the Western Balkans. Springer. pp. 101–102, 106. ISBN 9783319973524.
  37. ^ Alice Ackermann (2000). Making Peace Prevail: Preventing Violent Conflict in Macedonia. Syracuse University Press. p. 57. ISBN 9780815606024.
  38. ^ a b c Steven Levitsky; Lucan A. Way (2010). Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War. Cambridge University Press. pp. 125–128. ISBN 9780521709156.
  39. ^ Loring Danforth (1995). The Macedonian Conflict: Ethnic Nationalism in a Transnational World. Princeton University Press. p. 144. ISBN 0691043574. ...the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE), an ultranationalist party whose irredentist platform called for the creation of a "United Macedonia".
  40. ^ Jane K. Cowan (2000). Macedonia: The Politics of Identity and Difference. Pluto Press. p. 133. ISBN 9780745315898.
  41. ^ Marc Weller; Barbara Metzger; Niall Johnson, eds. (2008). Settling Self-Determination Disputes: Complex Power-sharing in Theory and Practice. BRILL. p. 275. ISBN 9789004164826.
  42. ^ Christopher K. Lamont (2010). International Criminal Justice and the Politics of Compliance. Ashgate. p. 98. ISBN 9780754679653.
  43. ^ "ВМРО-ДПМНЕ апсолутен победник со 56 градоначалници". Večer (in Macedonian). 28 September 2011. Archived from the original on 28 September 2011.
  44. ^ Naoum Kaytchev (2014). "Being Macedonian: Different types of ethnic identifications in the contemporary Republic of Macedonia". Politeja. 11 (4 (30)). ismo Wydziału Studiów Międzynarodowych i Politycznych Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego: 123–131. doi:10.12797/Politeja.11.2014.30.13.
  45. ^ a b c d e Boris Georgievski (27 October 2009). "Ghosts of the past endanger Macedonia's future". Balkan Insight.
  46. ^ Benjamin Langer; Julia Lechler (2010). Reading the City: Urban Space and Memory in Skopje. Univerlagtuberlin. p. 43. ISBN 978-3-7983-2129-8.
  47. ^ Ludomir R. Lozny (1 January 2011). Comparative Archaeologies: A Sociological View of the Science of the Past. Springer. p. 427. ISBN 978-1-4419-8225-4.
  48. ^ Vangeli Anastas (2011). "Nation-building ancient Macedonian style: the origins and the effects of the so-called antiquization in Macedonia". Nationalities Papers. 39: 13–32. doi:10.1080/00905992.2010.532775. S2CID 154923343.
  49. ^ "SDSM Allegations at Government on Skopje 2014 Project". Skopje: SkopjeDiem. 30 March 2011. Archived from the original on 4 January 2013. Retrieved 30 July 2012.
  50. ^ "Macedonian Culture Strategy: Milestone or Wish List?". Balkan Insight. 15 November 2012.
  51. ^ Joanne McEvoy (2015). Power-Sharing Executives: Governing in Bosnia, Macedonia, and Northern Ireland. University of Pennsylvania Press. p. 194. ISBN 9780812246513.
  52. ^ "В Скопие: Скулптурата на Симеон Радев била грешка". Vesti.bg (in Bulgarian). 11 April 2012.
  53. ^ "Macedonia Press Review – April 12, 2012". Balkan Insight. 12 April 2012.
  54. ^ "Photo: Macedonia's Ruling Party Builds Itself White Palace". Balkan Insight. 23 March 2015.
  55. ^
  56. ^ "CC of VMRO-DPMNE: We will not support the agreement with Bulgaria in Parliament". Meta.mk. 30 July 2017.
  57. ^ Otto Eibl; Miloš Gregor, eds. (2019). Thirty Years of Political Campaigning in Central and Eastern Europe. Springer Nature. pp. 263–264. ISBN 9783030276935.
  58. ^ Robert Hudson; Ivan Dodovski, eds. (2023). Macedonia's Long Transition: From Independence to the Prespa Agreement and Beyond. Springer Nature. pp. 32–34. ISBN 9783031207730.
  59. ^ "Court Freezes Macedonian Opposition's Property Assets". 1 November 2018. Retrieved 13 November 2018.
  60. ^ "Nikola Gruevski: Former North Macedonia Prime Minister given fifth prison sentence". Euronews. 8 June 2022.
  61. ^ EWB (22 July 2020). "Gruevski no longer honorary president of VMRO-DPMNE". European Western Balkans. Retrieved 28 July 2020.
  62. ^ "Macedonia Court Jails Ex-Interior Minister For Six Years". Balkan Insight. 8 October 2018.
  63. ^ Dimitri A. Sotiropoulos (2023). The Irregular Pendulum of Democracy: Populism, Clientelism and Corruption in Post-Yugoslav Successor States. Springer Nature. p. 212. ISBN 9783031256097.
  64. ^ "Hristijan Mickoski to Lead Macedonia's Frail Opposition". Balkan Insight. 23 December 2017.
  65. ^ "Wess Mitchell to VMRO-DPMNE leader Mickoski: We are disappointed with you!". www.balkaneu.com. 16 October 2018. Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  66. ^ "US ups pressure on FYROM opposition to ratify constitutional changes | Kathimerini". Retrieved 20 October 2018.
  67. ^ "Read Assistant Secretary A. Wess Mitchell's letter to VMRO-DPMNE Leader Hristijan Mickoski". U.S. Embassy in North Macedonia. 16 October 2018. Retrieved 31 July 2024.
  68. ^ "Macedonia's Parliament Backs 'Name' Agreement with Greece". Balkan Insight. 19 October 2018.
  69. ^ "Лидерът на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ Християн Мицкоски поиска освобождаването на арестувания за палежа на Културния клуб "Иван Михайлов" в Битоля". БТА. 8 June 2022.
  70. ^ "Influx of Anti-Bulgarian Rhetoric by the Macedonian Elite". Sofia News Agency. 20 April 2022.
  71. ^ "Игра на клубове: новите български сдружения разпалиха битката на власт и опозиция в Скопие". Дневник (in Bulgarian). 18 October 2022.
  72. ^ "ВМРО-ДПМНЕ предлага закон за "спорни имена на сдружения" след откриването на български клубове". Dir.bg (in Bulgarian). 17 October 2022.
  73. ^ "Лидерът на ВМРО-ДПМНЕ преброи 173 българи в Северна Македония". Mediapool.bg (in Bulgarian). 8 October 2022.
  74. ^ "Parliament adopts amendments to laws on associations and political parties". MIA. 2 November 2022.
  75. ^ Margarita Assenova (8 July 2022). "The Balkans Are Heating up Again". Jamestown.
  76. ^ "Debate Derailed In North Macedonian Parliament Amid Unrest Over Proposed Deal With EU, Bulgaria". Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 7 July 2022.
  77. ^ "ВМРО-ДПМНЕ обяви въпроса за референдума, свързан с Договора за приятелство с България". Dir.bg (in Bulgarian). 5 September 2022.
  78. ^ "North Macedonia Opposition Seeks Referendum Against Bulgaria Deal". Balkan Insight. 6 September 2022.
  79. ^ Лилия Чалева (16 August 2022). "Мицкоски се зарече да напусне политиката, ако българите бъдат вписани в Конституцията на РСМ". Dir.bg (in Bulgarian).
  80. ^ "Новият македонски президент подсказа: Политиката ще е против България - Новини от Actualno". www.actualno.com (in Bulgarian). 9 May 2024. Retrieved 16 May 2024.
  81. ^ Krassen Nikolov (14 June 2024). "Bulgaria says North Macedonia risks EU accession over recent statements". Euractiv.
  82. ^ "North Macedonia set for rocky ties with EU as nationalists win presidential, parliamentary election". Euractiv. 9 May 2024.
  83. ^ "North Macedonia's parliament elects Hristijan Mickoski as PM". Deutsche Welle. 24 June 2024.
  84. ^ "Close Allies, Fewer Albanians and a Moscow Fan – North Macedonia's Govt Takes Shape". Balkan Insight. 20 June 2024.
  85. ^ "УНИЈА НА МЛАДИ СИЛИ НА ВМРО-ДПМНЕ". ВМРО-ДПМНЕ (in Macedonian). Retrieved 17 July 2024.
  86. ^ Oliver P. Richmond; Gëzim Visoka, eds. (2022). The Palgrave Encyclopedia Of Peace And Conflict Studies. Springer Nature. p. 353. ISBN 9783030779542.
  87. ^ Florian Bieber (2019). The Rise of Authoritarianism in the Western Balkans. Springer International Publishing. p. 54. ISBN 9783030221485.

Further reading

  • Mattioli, Fabio (2020). Dark Finance: Illiquidity and Authoritarianism at the Margins of Europe. Stanford University Press. ISBN 978-1-5036-1294-5.
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=VMRO-DPMNE&oldid=1256520458"